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**INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING:
THE ULTIMATE FOREIGN POLICY TOOL FOR THE
21ST CENTURY**

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: James L. Walker, Colonel, USAFR

TITLE: International Military Education and Training: The
Ultimate Foreign Policy Tool for The 21st Century

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 9 February 1998 **PAGES:** 27 **CLASSIFICATION:** Unclassified

International Military Education and Training (IMET) is more important today than ever before. Security assistance has historically played a prominent role in foreign and defense policy. The IMET program is an essential complement to the U.S. defense effort, in that it represents the most visible aspect of U.S. foreign and defense policy and its implementation results in tangible evidence of U.S. interests and presence. Such evidence is illustrated with the IMET program, which enables governments to increase their internal defense capabilities. Extended IMET provides the opportunity for foreign civilian leaders to learn, through U.S. guidance and assistance, how to establish a practical infrastructure and economic base in their own country. This program helps achieve and maintain regional stability. IMET is truly the ultimate foreign policy tool that will give the U.S. an edge over enemies, defend against attack and protect vital interests in the twenty-first century. Congress should recognize the strategic importance of IMET and appropriate additional funding.

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING: THE ULTIMATE FOREIGN POLICY TOOL FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Human conflict shapes culture, creates alliances in response to crises, and forces nations to prepare for uncertain future threats. Weapons development stems from human conflict, enabling societies to gain advantage over enemies, defend against attack, and protect vital interests. Weapons, crude or sophisticated, provide societies with a sense of security. Arsenal size is subject to vital governmental interests and public perception of threats to social interests. Our society is no different from early or modern cultures.

The United States industrial complex fastidiously produced weapons to counter the Soviet threat during the Cold War. The perceived threat shaped U.S. policy and social support for advancing weapons production rates and technology. The net result was an arsenal of very expensive weapons that was never directly employed and was later subsequently destroyed. The U.S. invested large amounts of money, materiel, and manpower during the Cold War to provide security assistance to other allied and friendly nations.

In the absence of the Cold War threat, U.S. Foreign Policy is shifting away from a single threat ideology to focus on global interests and international democratization. The U.S. military's roles and missions are moving away from warfighting toward peacekeeping and peace enforcing operations. American social

support for retaining Cold War weapons and deterrent forces has dissipated. Public tolerance for combatant and non-combatant casualties has been exhausted. The demand for a precision weapon that guarantees protection of U.S. interests while producing no civilian collateral damage has never been higher.

The ultimate 21st century foreign policy tool was actually developed during the Truman administration. However, few if any knew how to exploit the full potential of this tool and even if they did, there were no social or political outcries to use it. The tool is known as international military education and training (IMET). The IMET concept is a future-based investment account in which the dividend is a potentially more democratic world and the United States is the benefactor. Foreign nations select their most promising military officers to be trained in the United States. Many of these promising young officers may eventually rise to powerful positions within their government. Personal and professional associations established through the IMET experience in the U.S. may be instrumental in maintaining a long-term diplomatic relationship with the foreign officer's country. These relationships may potentially aid in establishing foreign security interests that are more harmonious with those of the United States and possibly assist in promoting democracy.

IMET was expanded in 1991 to include both military and civilian cross-sections of foreign countries. The civilian slice is known as E-IMET. The expansion allows civilians with defense-

related interests to participate in IMET programs. The distinguishing difference between the two programs is the training location. E-IMET shows great promise in its ability to bring senior civilian and military leaders together in their own country for shared confidence building educational experiences.¹ Best of all, compared to modern precision weapons, IMET is very inexpensive, extremely precise, and very effective in protecting U.S. vital interests. However, unlike modern weapons, the intent of IMET is to produce a positive collateral impact.

The fall of the Iron Curtain and the end to the Cold War marks a new era in American culture. Conflict between societies will continue as will alliances and weapons development. However, current U.S. political and social interests are focused on international democratization and free market economies.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that IMET and E-IMET are the foreign policy tools that will enable the U.S. to gain the advantage and to protect vital interests in the 21st Century. In developing this argument, the history of security assistance programs and congressional involvement is necessary to demonstrate the unlimited potential of IMET as a foreign policy tool. Additionally, IMET can help achieve the current U.S. national security strategy by balancing ends, ways, and means in these economically challenging times.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

In the conduct of foreign relations, the United States, like every other state is concerned primarily with the achievement of those objectives of national interest which it conceives to be of paramount significance. If the management of our external affairs is to enjoy rationality, it must have goals that harmonize with, and supplement, the internal policies and programs of the Government, whether they may be the promotion of commerce and trade, the acquisition of territory or power, or the maintenance of peace and security.

— Harry S. Truman January 1949

In delivering his inaugural speech, President Truman changed U.S. foreign policy and foreign relations forever. For the first time in the nation's history, U.S. public national interests turned from internal domestic affairs to international relations. Isolationism would no longer serve the national security interest of the United States. Global engagement in two world wars, the use of nuclear weapons, and subsequent fifty years of Cold War with the Soviet Union has propelled the U.S. onto the world stage as a globally engaged nation.² U.S. peace-time engagement is not a recent initiative. The U.S. has been actively pursuing this policy for over fifty years.

In June of 1947, Secretary of State George C. Marshall announced that the United States was willing to assist in the European economic recovery. U.S. military assistance provided Greece the ability to suppress the communist guerilla revolt in 1947. Congress did not enact the European Recovery Program until April of 1948.³ The assistance provided to Greece implemented the Truman Doctrine and was the U.S. military's first shift away

from a strictly occupational mission.⁴ By the time the European Recovery Program ended in 1952, the U.S. had contributed more than \$13 billion to help put Europe back on its feet.⁵ The U.S. military continued assisting Western European countries throughout the 1950s as part of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.⁶ Security assistance programs were authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Act of 1976, and other amendments and related statutes.⁷

Today, the U.S. Army's predominant interface with host nations occurs through an outgrowth of security assistance under the Security Assistance Training Program (SATP). IMET is a primary sub-component of SATP. The size of the program is measured in terms of cost rather than strategic significance.

IMET is intended to enhance the proficiency, professional performance, and readiness of foreign armed forces. This definition implies a "hands-on" military-to-military interaction focusing engagement at the tactical and operational level. There are many less conspicuous strategic implications in IMET engagement. Congressional support for the IMET program will provide the U.S. with a more advantageous foreign policy tool to use against current and future enemies.

CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE IMET PROGRAM

The IMET program was formalized as an element of military assistance under the National Assistance Act of 1961.⁹ The purpose and implied policy brings foreign military officers to

the United States for unique education opportunities as an investment for the future promotion of U.S. interests. The strategy used in support of IMET is that for a nation's small investment the potential national security return would be justified. Those foreign military officers selected to attend the IMET program have great potential to rise to prominent positions within their respective governments. The U.S. national security interests in their countries are more easily achieved when Washington interfaces with IMET trained military and civilian leaders.¹⁰

A trend toward greater congressional oversight of national security policy began in the 1970's. Senate and House authorization committees as well as appropriations subcommittees are increasing their involvement in determining U.S. foreign policy. Legislation is used to delimit and guide implementation of military assistance programs. These four committees often require the executive branch to provide notification before specific military assistance programs can be implemented. Additionally, they control the inclusion (or exclusion) of specific countries for military assistance and set funding levels for specific nations.¹¹ Often these actions are based on domestic concerns and perspectives rather than focusing on genuine foreign policy issues.

In the early 1990s, Congress felt a need to expand the IMET program to reach a larger cross section of foreign societies.

Many in Congress felt that opening IMET to include non-military members of foreign governments would increase the chance for success in developing a more democratic philosophy within foreign nations.¹² In 1991, Congress enacted a variation to IMET for education pertaining to resource management, civilian control, military law, and regard for human rights. This variation is known as the extended-international military education and training program (E-IMET) and allows foreign civilians to take part in IMET training.¹³

However, the question remains unclear as to whether or not E-IMET is fully supported by all four of the authorization and appropriation committees. Since the 1991 enactment, there has been no congressional funding for the E-IMET program. Finances for the E-IMET program are presently taken from the IMET account. This financial arrangement causes either the military or the civilian program to suffer at the other's expense. The funding trend for all military assistance programs has been steadily on the decline since the mid 1980s.¹⁴ Section 506, Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) authorizes the President to draw down defense articles from DoD inventories and provide defense services and military education to foreign governments.¹⁵ In FY 1996, Section 506, reductions in FAA funding for equipment and training (including IMET) exceeded \$223 million.¹⁶ The trend toward reducing appropriations for IMET appears to be contradictory to the intent of the 1991 extended IMET philosophy.

Another trend has developed in Congress to further dilute the effectiveness of IMET and E-IMET. In 1992, Congress suspended the IMET program for Indonesia. The suspension was in response to a November 12, 1991, shooting incident between Indonesian security forces and Timorese demonstrators. Congress demands an accounting for the missing persons resulting from that incident and others who disappeared in 1995 and 1996.¹⁷ These conditions and demands placed on Indonesia resemble more of a U.S. domestic social interest rather than economic or strategic interest. In many cases, the restrictions Congress places on foreign countries resemble the United Nations' use of sanctions. The 105th Congress, in its first session, legislated new reforms into U.S. foreign assistance programs. In general, the President must withhold assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to any foreign government providing economic, development, or security assistance for, or engaging in non-market based trade with the Government of Cuba.¹⁸ Support for future funding levels of assistance to Egypt will be determined largely on whether Egypt fulfills its obligations to develop normal relations with Israel.¹⁹ Funding for assistance to the Russian Federation has been approved, providing they meet certain conditions to qualify. The government of the Russian Federation must terminate all cooperation and transfers of goods, services, and technology with Iran and Cuba.²⁰ The 105th Congress does grant IMET eligibility for Panama and Haiti for fiscal years 1998 and 1999.²¹

Additionally, the 105th Congress grants assistance for training civilian personnel of the Ministry of Defense of the Government of Nicaragua.²² With this legislation, Congress has temporarily reversed the trend of steady decline in IMET funding that has been taking place since 1987.²³ With all the attention Congress has given IMET since 1961, they are no closer to recognizing the strategic value IMET has in foreign engagement.

More than 100,000 students from 114 countries have attended IMET courses between 1976 and 1995. Based on these statistics, the record of congressional support for the IMET program appears to be strong. However, in reality, the involvement of the authorization and appropriations committees in military assistance is beginning to blur the line between foreign policy and domestic policy. Congressional legislation pertaining to conditions to be met for IMET and E-IMET should focus more on the democratization of the international community and building free-market societies. To remain a viable resource in helping the U.S. respond to future crises, Congress must recognize its strategic value in supporting the national security strategy.

IMET AS A PART OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Future U.S. National Security Strategy will be measured by its success in providing for the common defense, promoting the general welfare, and securing liberty for all Americans.²⁴ President Clinton's national security strategy is patterned in the past after the Marshall Plan and U.S. security assistance

programs. He paraphrases President Truman's inaugural address by stating "our strategy recognizes a simple truth: we must lead abroad if we are to be secure at home, but we cannot lead abroad unless we are strong at home."²⁵ The national security strategy goal is to protect the lives and safety of Americans; maintain U.S. sovereignty, its values, institutions, and territories; and provide for a prosperous nation for the people to enjoy.²⁶ The underpinning of this strategic goal is advancing American interests through engagement in shaping the democratization and free markets around the world.

IMET is an underutilized foreign policy tool for engagement in the international enhancement of U.S. interests and security. The idea behind the IMET program is to educate younger foreign military and civilian officers in the United States and in their own countries in order to capitalize from the investment through the promotion of U.S. interests.²⁷ Exposing IMET students to U.S. values and culture work hand-in-hand with military and political education to promote democracy. Civilian control of the military is the cornerstone of the U.S. democracy model. E-IMET brings the civilian and military leadership together, often for the first time to build trust and blend the political strategy with military strategy. Additionally, the training provided in IMET and E-IMET programs enables graduates to assist their countries in conserving resources and efficiently using military resources and become more self-reliant in their national

defense.²⁸ The more self-reliant a foreign nation becomes, the less likely the U.S. future expenses will be to support that nation in the future. This adds even greater returns on the small amount invested. Furthermore, the closer foreign countries align themselves to U.S. international interests the greater the possibilities of forming and maintaining alliances and coalitions to achieve those interests. The coalition formed during Desert Storm is a perfect example. Without the previous U.S. investment in IMET and E-IMET, the coalition would have been more difficult to build and almost impossible to maintain. IMET provides the opportunity for countries to shape their future leaders. It also provides a medium for the U.S. in shaping the international environment.

USING IMET TO SHAPE THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Many aspects of U.S. security strategy are focused on shaping the international environment to prevent or deter future threats. The U.S. has many tools by which to shape the international environment to favor its interests and security. Diplomacy, international assistance, arms control, nonproliferation initiatives, and military presence are a few of the examples of shaping tools.²⁹ IMET combines the best of diplomacy, international assistance, and military presence shaping tools. IMET, by nature, implies diplomatic intervention. Diplomacy provides the first line of defense against threats to U.S. security and vital interests. IMET is "preventative

diplomacy," implemented through national assistance programs by the military. IMET brings foreign nations together with the U.S. in promoting global stability through regional security and military cooperation. In assessing every weapon resulting from the history of human conflict, IMET exceeds the payload and technology of all previous and existing conventional weapons. Accuracy, lethality, and minimized collateral damage are terms used to determine which weapon is best for a specific target. IMET, as a foreign policy tool, can be substituted for traditional weapons of war to provide the United States with an increased sense of security, gain advantage over enemies, and protect vital interests. IMET is right on target, extremely lethal in destroying traditional paradigms, and maximizes collateral impact on its intended target. By deploying the weapon of education and training in times of peace, the U.S. will be better postured to respond to future threats and challenges.

THE IMET ROLE IN RESPONDING TO CRISES

U.S. national security strategy acknowledges that any effort to shape a secure international environment does not guarantee the elimination of future crises. Like the shaping effort, there are many tools available to the U.S. for responding to crises. However, with diminishing resources, U.S. responses have to be measured in terms of national interest. National interests are categorized in three areas; vital interests—those relating to the survival of our nation; important national interests—those

affecting the quality of life in our nation; and humanitarian interests— those being dictated by our national values.³⁰ It is not in the best interest of the U.S. to respond to crisis unilaterally, but to act in alliance or partnership with other nations that share common interests.

To meet the challenges posed by recent transitions to democracy in countries throughout the world, IMET has been expanded to include programs focusing on human rights, defense resource management, military justice, and civil-military relations.³¹ The global environment is becoming more and more democratic. IMET builds on common interests among nations transitioning into democratic societies. Foreign military leaders have the opportunity to build personal relationships with corresponding U.S. military leaders. This relationship is a critical enabler for developing and ensuring cohesion between potential coalition members and achieving the U.S. national security strategy. While IMET works extremely well with the shaping and responding tenants of the national security strategy, IMET is also invaluable preparation for tomorrow's uncertainty.

USING IMET IN PREPARING FOR THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE

Preparing for tomorrow begins today by fully supporting the shaping and responding tenants of the national security strategy while simultaneously posturing those capabilities to meet future threats. The key to the success of that effort is the need to promote innovation, operational concepts, capabilities, technolo-

gies and organizational structures, modernized equipment, and renew U.S. commitment to international diplomacy.³² The U.S. must ensure that its diplomatic representation accurately supports its global interests. This must be the case if the U.S. is going to remain an influential voice on international issues affecting vital, important, and humanitarian national values. The U.S. will preserve that influence as long as diplomatic capabilities, military wherewithal, and the economic base to support its commitments remains credible.³³

As long as unknown future crises are perched to challenge U.S. national interests, IMET will remain a major security assistance instrument of foreign policy. Security assistance will continue to serve U.S. interests by assisting allies and friends to acquire, maintain, and, if necessary, employ the capability for self-defense. IMET is a solid investment for the future stability of many countries worldwide and for future U.S. access to and interaction with senior leaders in those countries.³⁴ E-IMET may be the best long-term investment the U.S. could make in its preparation for the uncertain future. The IMET and E-IMET returns, based on the small investment required, show the greatest promise for maximum dividends. E-IMET brings senior civilian and military together in their own country, often for the first time, for shared, confidence building educational experiences. E-IMET however, was not independently funded. Any investment in E-IMET draws resources from the IMET account. As

with all government-sponsored programs that require resourcing, Congress is involved and actively participates in controlling IMET and E-IMET expenditures. Just as Congress was slow to enact the European Recovery Program in 1948, they are also slow in recognizing the strategic political significance the IMET program offers in balancing ends, ways, and means of supporting national security strategy.

ENDS

Today, closer to the start of the twenty-first century than to the end of the Cold War, we are embarking on a period of construction to build new frameworks, partnerships and institutions—and adapt existing ones—that strengthen America's security and prosperity. We are working to construct new cooperative security arrangements, rid the world of weapons that target whole populations, build a truly global economy, and promote democratic values and economic reform. Ours is a moment of historic opportunity to create a safer, more prosperous tomorrow—to make a difference in the lives of our citizens.

—William J. Clinton, May 1997

This vision represents a desired end-state for the twenty-first century.³⁵ President Clinton's words suggest a precise and succinct operational objective and focus for IMET and E-IMET training programs. Both programs build new frameworks for new democracies and partnerships between foreign civilian and military institutions. Both strengthen security and prosperity by promoting American ideology and values. Both programs build alliances and coalitions through mutually beneficial exchanges of

ideas and moral principles for defeating weapons of mass destruction. Both promote democratic values and economic reform.

An article appearing in the Christian Science Monitor during the Gulf War quoted Lee H. Hamilton as saying "all eyes are on the Gulf crisis, but the world doesn't stop; Washington has other policy matters, in other corners of the globe, it must keep tending to." Lee H. Hamilton was speaking as a democratic congressman from Indiana and as chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Congressman Hamilton was referring to Angola and the Portuguese-mediated negotiations that was bringing the Angolan government and the UNITA rebels close to a settlement of their civil war.³⁶ With Portuguese mediation both sides agreed to a settlement providing for a cease-fire, cutting off foreign arms supplies, and multi-party elections. An important footnote to include in this case is that 80% of the Portuguese military leadership is IMET trained.³⁷ Their mediation of the Angolan crisis reflects substantial support of U.S. values.

A community of free, stable, and prosperous nations acting together while respecting the dignity and rights of the individual and adhering to the principles of national sovereignty and international law is President Clinton's goal for the future.

To achieve this end, IMET and E-IMET may be considered one important way to achieve the U.S. national security strategy in the twenty-first century.

WAYS

Full-scale development and global employment of the IMET and E-IMET programs will help theater commanders maintain stability in their areas of responsibility. IMET is the primary security assistance program for the Ukraine. It allows close military-to-military contact and is building trust and unity between the U.S. and the former Soviet block country.³⁸ Through the FY 1996 IMET appropriations, both Ukrainian military officers and civilians were exposed to U.S. techniques and procedures and in-country language training. The U.S. trained Ukrainian language specialists to teach English to many of the Ukrainian IMET students before they depart for the U.S. Ukrainian students are scheduled to attend a variety of entry-level and technical courses, U.S. military Command and Staff Colleges, and in graduate level training.³⁹ This is a perfect example of how IMET is being used to assist newly emerging democracies, especially in the states associated with the former USSR.

Unified commander-in-chiefs (CINCs) have a significant affect on the role of military assistance programs within their area of responsibility. CINCs provide U.S. ambassadors and country teams input for their Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance report (AIASA). CINCs provide a unique perspective for the geographic region's democratization process and economic development progress in the unified command's annual report to congress. One such perspective is provided:

IMET promotes military-to-military relations and exposes international military and civilian officials to U.S. values and the democratic process. In 1996, IMET sent 1,221 international students from the USEUCOM theater to schools in the U.S.; of these, 170 students from 38 countries were trained as English language instructors. IMET paid for English language laboratories in five Central European countries, and over \$430K in English instructional materials were sent to 32 countries to assist their efforts to establish a solid foundation in English. In 1997, 59 USEUCOM countries will participate in the IMET program, and IMET will continue to assist their English language programs. More than 500 senior civilian and military leaders from throughout the AOR are IMET trained including twenty percent of Turkey's flag officers and eighty percent of the senior leadership in Portugal.

—General George A. Joulwan, March 1997

IMET also has a direct impact on most countries in this theater as they establish democratic institutions and civilian control of the military. In 1996, 19 countries hosted IMET-sponsored education teams that taught subjects such as military justice and legal systems, civil-military relations, maritime law enforcement, and budget planning. A more ambitious 1997 plan will try to reach out to 32 countries.⁴⁰

Increasing the number of foreign nations participating in IMET is a logical enhancement to global democratization. Increasing IMET funding and programs fortifies future success potential by increasing the overall number of foreign military and civilian leaders receiving training. In a time when costs are increasing and resources are shrinking, politicians and the general public are not easy to persuade.

Contemporary observers today insist that democratic nations are far less likely to wage war than non-democratic nations. If this is true, investing in the development of independent democracies today would logically reduce potential conflict in the future. The United States is the most technologically advanced nation in the world. Leveraging technology to increase the number of foreign nations receiving IMET follows that logic. Regardless of the method used to enlarge IMET availability for all nations of the world, it requires an increase in funding. A comparatively small increase in funding in the IMET program today is more affordable than going to war in the future. If the end-state is an effective national security strategy then the means justify the end in these economically challenging times.

MEANS

The 43.4 million-dollar budget programmed for FY 1997 represents a 3.6 million-dollar increase in IMET funding compared to FY 1996.⁴¹ Future economic trends are uncertain and demand prudent reengineering the military infrastructure and streamline support structures where possible. However, reducing funding for IMET is not an option. Means must be found to provide continued support for this valuable nation building program. Further reducing the military end strength and abandoning force modernization to fund IMET is a dangerous risk to our vital interests and those of our allies. Congressional oversight to national resource commitments is constitutionally mandated. The

rising number of programs competing for decreasing funds dictate a need for military leaders to convince Congress of the importance of IMET.

Legislation is required to increase IMET funding. The most promising solution is using a combination of commercial industry and government funding. In today's acquisition process, a fixed-price contract with an award fee and cost plus incentive fee contracts are options used when certain conditions are met.

Award-fee provisions may be used in fixed-price contracts when the Government wishes to motivate a contractor and other incentives cannot be used because contractor performance cannot be measured objectively. The cost-plus-incentive-fee contract is a cost-reimbursement contract that provides for the initially negotiated fee to be adjusted later by a formula based on the relationship of total allowable costs to total target costs. This contract type specifies a target cost, a target fee, minimum and maximum fees, and a fee adjustment formula.⁴²

This increase or decrease is intended to provide an incentive for the contractor to manage the contract effectively. The possibility of using a small percentage of government contracting award fees and incentive fees to fund an increase in IMET has merit. Contracting private industry to teach some of the IMET courses in exchange for business opportunities in foreign countries is also an option. Congress controls funding for all governmental endeavors. To that end, Congress exercises

fiscal control through legislative actions that control, limit, restrict, exclude, or place conditions on U.S. security assistance programs. Congress has already enacted legislation reforms for the defense acquisition process, outsourcing where possible, to reduce military spending. Consolidating acquisition and security assistance appropriations through creative contracting practices may be only one solution to free up funds for IMET. The IMET program in the future must exploit the potential of existing information technology and leverage all advancing technology opportunities to enable the United States to achieve its national security strategy.⁴³

CONCLUSION

The national security interests of the United States are best served through training and equipping friendly foreign defense forces and to otherwise develop their defense potential. IMET and E-IMET military assistance programs help achieve U.S. national security objectives in many ways. First, they enhance U.S. influence and assure friends and allies of the strength of U.S. commitments. Second, as with most U.S. peacetime engagement activities, IMET and E-IMET programs contribute to deterrence and conflict prevention. Third, IMET and E-IMET build unity and achieve coalition building potential between nations. U.S. security depends on durable relationships with allies and friendly nations. As the U.S. military continues to right-size

and global conflict potential remains unpredictable, IMET and E-IMET programs are indispensable.

Ideally, the regional combatant commanders working with U.S. ambassadors, will be able to tailor IMET and E-IMET programs to productively support national policy objectives rather than just reacting to uncertainty. Military assistance programs such as IMET and E-IMET encourage the development of viable cooperative defense arrangements, making U.S. unilateral intervention less likely. In the event of conflict, U.S. intervention will be in partnership with strong coalitions that increase the probability of military success and reduce commitments for U.S. forces.

IMET and E-IMET programs also help shape foreign defense establishments' views and practices on important issues pertaining to democracy, civilian control of the military, and respect for human rights. These programs cannot work miracles in every case or convince those who will not listen. They can provide extremely useful perspectives, skills and knowledge to foreign leaders who want to reform or otherwise improve defense establishments and further democracy in their country.

Finally, IMET and E-IMET impart powerful ideas and offer role models to younger officials who can work for change from below and who, as later emerging leaders, initiate change from the top. Through IMET and E-IMET engagement, coalitions and allied forces are shaped and prepared to respond along side U.S. forces in defense of vital interests and to help achieve the U.S.

international democratic agenda. International military education and training is truly the ultimate foreign policy tool that will give the U.S. an edge over enemies, defend against attack and protect vital interests in the twenty-first century.

(Word count: 4965)

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³⁶ <http://www.csmonitor.com/plweb-cgi...n%26military%26training%26programs> 2.

³⁷ General George A. Joulwan, U.S. Army, Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command, Statement before the House National Security Commission, March 19, 1997.

³⁸ John P. Connell, "Ukraine" The DISAM Journal, (Fall 1996), 9.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ General George A. Joulwan, U.S. Army, Commander-in-Chief, United States European Command, Statement before the House National Security Commission, March 19, 1997.

⁴¹ William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, (Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense, April 1997), J-1.

⁴² Defense Acquisition Deskbook, (Joint Publications Office, JPO, 2275 D Street, Bldg 16, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio). Section 16-204.

⁴³ William S. Cohen, Report Of The Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, (Washington: Office of the Secretary of Defense) 7.

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